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Since colonial times, Somalia has been going through authoritarian and/or democratic transitions. The 
transitory position of Somalia was determined by geography, religion, ethnicity, tribal origins, socio-economic, 
and political system. Somalia is one of the longest protracted crises in the world and recurrently victim of the 
violent extremism that breathes into the political, social and economic country’s unrest. Somalia remains a 
major threat to peace and stability in the Horn of Africa. More importantly, continuous uprisings, violence, and 
conflicts threaten peace, stability, and security in Somalia. This paper examines the root causes of these 
developments by considering international, regional and domestic actors in state security, peace, and stability. 
How tackling of terrorism, extremism and organized crime are conditioned by the effectiveness of the system 
of governance, the rule of law, economic growth and development and, more importantly, state security, 
police, and defense. This paper also placed the questions of terrorism and conflict within a global security 
framework and the fight against terrorism, organized crime, and illegal human trafficking and migrations.  
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Introduct ion  
The uprising in 1986 against the regime of Siad Barre 
characterized the beginning of the Somalia civil war till 
1991. When Siad Barre was dismissed from the power 
the conflict expanded among Somalia warlords. In 
response to the humanitarian crises and the ongoing 
conflict in 1992 the United Nations with the Security 
Council Resolution 792/1992 (UNSCR) established the 
United Task Forces, UNITAF, for Operation Restore Hope 
led by established the United Nations Operations in 
Somalia, UNOSOM I from April 1992 to March 1993 with 
the UNSCR 733/1992 and UNOSOM II from March 1993 
to March 1995 with the UNSCR 794/1992 the USA 
(December 1992 – May 1993) and contemporary. The 
UNSCR reaffirmed the UN commitment to the cease-
fire, humanitarian assistance, and tackling of the threats 
to peace and security. 
 
Between 2000 and 2008 the Somali government was 
challenged by the Union of the Islamic Courts (UIC) 
Midowga Maxkamadaha Islaamiga and the militant wing 
of Al Shabaab link to Islamic terrorism of Al Qaeda. From 
the year 2008 to 2012, in spite the strong resistance of 
the Somali’s central government, Somalis reached an 
agreement on a government of national transition under 
which Somalia moved in 2012 from a centralized to a 
federal government of six states, divided into eighteen 
administrative regions or also called gobollada, which in 
turn are subdivided into districts. In June 2013, eighteen 
years later from the United Nations Operations in 
Somalia the United Nations Security Council with the 
Security Council Resolution 2102/2013 deployed the 
United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia, UNSOM, a 
political mission mandated to support the state building 
and the peace process in the country, allowing 
humanitarian aids to reach a population affected by 
decades of civil war. The United Nations Assistance 
Mission supported the Federal Government of Somalia 
by providing the strategic policy on peace-building and 
state-building in terms of effective governance, security 
reforms, rule of law, the functioning of the federal 
system, constitutional reforms and fair and transparent 
elections. Then, the UN was mandated to bring Somalis 
together to rebuild the country in what Staub defines  
 
“common goals”: the strengths of the existing groups’ 
identities and previous successes in achieving joint goals 
affect the extent to which intergroup cooperation  
reduces conflict  and results in positive ties. By focusing 
on common goals, there is a greater likelihood of 
successful outcomes which will, in turn, contribute to the 
nurturing of a positive outlook on the other, thereby 
resulting in greater trust and caring towards each other, 
which will promote social cohesion and develop 
nationalism. 
 
UNSOM ‘s mandate has been renewed up to the UNSCR 
2408/2018 till March 2019 due to the challenges the 
Federal Republic of Somalia is facing consolidating state 
formation and federalism. In fact, beside the challenges 
posed by Al Shabaab Somalia remains extremely divided 
internally due to clans fighting for territorial power, 
federal resources appropriation, and federal members 
states conflicts and armed clashes over borders like 
Somaliland and Puntland on the contentious issue of 
Sool, Sanaag and Ayn or Puntland and Galmudug over 
the divided city of Gaalkacyo for instance. The 
destabilizing factor that the inter-regional conflicts can 
bring about is generally underestimated. The 
International Crisis Group reported:  
 
Somalia’s foreign partners appear to underestimate the 
risk of conflict in the north. They tend to assess the 
north’s stability in reference to the south – a low bar 
that may have meant warning signs slipped under the 
radar. That the crisis has deteriorated almost to the 
point of open war speaks to a number of realities. 
Outside powers have mostly preferred “positive” 
narratives that oversell the north’s recovery – and that 
of Somalia more broadly – and downplay risks. Leaders 
in both Puntland and Somaliland appear wedded to 
brinksmanship and believe they have little incentive to 
make peace. Local and international mediation systems 
are disjointed and mostly reactive. Puntland and 
Somaliland are sliding toward a protracted conflict with 
enormously destabilising consequences for not only 
northern Somalia but the country as a whole. War is still 
avoidable, but to forestall it both sides need to take a 
step back, dial down their rhetoric and allow for 
mediation led by the UN. Their long-running dispute over 
Soog and Sanaag regions will inevitably take time to 
resolve. But the priority today is for the two sides to de-
escalate, arrive at some modus vivendi and accept a 
mechanism for determining that status. The alternative 
is a war in northern Somalia that would be extremely 
costly to both sides, tarnish their international 
reputations, worsen an already grave humanitarian 
predicament and undercut efforts to counter Al-Shabaab 
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State of  Security in the Federal Republ ic  of 
Somalia  
The state of Somalia collapsed for almost two decades 
under the attacks of Al Shabaab violent extremism, 
preventing the country’s economic, political and social 
development and has increased the radicalization of 
young Somalis deprived of life opportunities. Somalia is 
the hub for piracy, illegal fishing, human trafficking, 
import and export of charcoal, arms and ammunition 
trafficking, import and export of oxidisers use for the 
improvised explosive devices used by Al Shabaab in its 
terrorist attack against security forces and civilians.  
Back in 2006 with the Security Council Resolution 
1725/2006, the African Union peacekeeping operation 
AMISOM entered Somalia to maintain and support the 
peace process and re-conquers the territories controlled 
by Al Shabaab. The loss of numerous lives of the 
Ugandans, Burundians, Sierra Leon, Kenyans, Ethiopians 
soldiers of the African Union extensively proved the 12 
years commitment of the regional organization to 
restore peace in Somalia and the region but without 
fully succeed in defeating Al Shabaab. AMISOM 
peacekeeping operation reached the number of 25.000 
units in 2016 and from 2017 has initiated the downsizing 
leaving the Somali National Army and the Somali Police 
Forces to replace the AMISOM. 
 
Often the territories liberated by the AMISOM’s troop 
were quickly regained by Al Shabaab that effectively and 
efficiently provides services to the communities 
exploiting the absence of the central and federal 
government to advance its goal and set up a 
fundamentalist regime terrorizing Somali’s institution 
and civilians across the country and in the region. 
Somali’s central governance and Federal states continue 
to struggle in providing services to those communities 
liberated by the African Union favoring Al Shaabab 
return and its quick response to counter community’s 
need. Contrary to international organizations Al 
Shabaab does not have to go through any government’s 
channel, to deliver aid because it can easily approach 
communities in a bottom up approach enshrining in the 
community. On the contrary, the international 
organizations, such as the European Union, USAID, and 
the United Nations, must go through government 
institutions to deliver aid or provide support to the 
communities in a top down approach that often does 
not expose them directly to the communities and most 
of all it is not perceived and received by the 
communities.  
The Al Qaeda affiliated group Al-Shabaab (AS) are 
constantly engaged in fighting by AMISOM forces 
throughout Somalia. Strongholds for AS include 
extensive parts of Jubba, and in pockets of Galmuduud 
and Puntland. AS has predominantly been restricted to 
asymmetrical attacks across the country, which were 
aimed at the security forces and civilians. The most 
recent attacks of 26th November, claimed by Al Shabaab, 
targeted the Mogadishu city centre and the northern 
city of Galkayo, 24 people lost their lives in the attacks. 
 
Al Shabaab continues to demonstrate its ability to 
launch high profile attacks against state institutions, 
buildings and hotels, particularly in Mogadishu. 
Although Al Shabaab suffered significant losses and 
displacement from main bases in areas such as Dinsoor 
and Bardheere they enlarge the presence in peripheral 
districts of Mogadishu of specialized cells to conduct 
asymmetric attacks, possibly to deflect attention from 
operations in Southern Somalia. AS increased the 
number of armed fighters for planned complex attacks. 
Their attack procedures showed evolution and possibly 
an indication of their intent to continue to use a system, 
the large complex attacks, that has shown positive 
results since its introduction in June 2015, successfully 
conducted against the Somali National Army (SNA) and 
Kenyan Defence Force (KDF).  Having lost physical 
control of key areas, including revenue-generating ports 
such as Kismayo and Barawe, and a number of key 
leaders, AS has become more focused on terrorist 
activity and has changed its capability, including types of 
fighters and weaponry. Well-planned targeted political 
assassinations, as well as attacks on security forces and 
foreign presence, are currently the main actions 
undertaken, including in Mogadishu. Just depriving AS of 
its vast areas of territorial control is not expected to 
result in an effective end to its activities in Somalia. It 
has proved resilient and is also now well embedded in 
neighboring states, including Kenya, where it can 
conduct both operations and "back office" activities. The 
war in Yemen potentially opens up new opportunities 
for AS, given its long-standing and trusted links with Al 
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). In particular, 
there is a risk of easier transit for terrorist fighters and 
easier access to arms supplies from Yemen through 
Somaliland. Although the so-called Islamic State (ISIS) 
has attempted to change the allegiance of AQ (and have 
had some success at the tactical level) it is unlikely that 
the AS leadership will take such a step. The Yemen crisis
The Forgotten Somalia: A Key Factor for Peace and Stability in the Horn of Africa 
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has the potential to significantly alter the regional 
dynamics. A clearly focused Yemen analysis, definition 
of EU objectives, and subsequent measures to address 
this issue may become key to a broader response.   
 
Fighting  Terrorism and Transnational 
Organized Cr ime 
Somalia’s internal instability is a threat to peace and 
security in the region also due to the porous border and 
the uncontrolled 3,300 km of maritime coast due to the 
lack of maritime security forces infrastructure. The 
Somali coastline is the longest in Africa and has three 
major ports, Berbera in Somaliland, Bosasso in Puntland 
and Kismayo in Jubaland, which are often illegally used 
to traffic illegal weapons, charcoal, livestock, and 
agricultural products as sources of revenue to finance Al 
Shabaab.  The conflict in Yemen has also increased the 
arms trafficking in Berbera, Somaliland as a route for 
transport in and out of Somalia. Somalia is under the 
Security Council Sanction 2385/2017 on Arms embargo, 
chemical weapons and import and export of charcoal to 
and from Somalia. Al Shabaab (AS) continues to remain 
a significant threat to internal stability and security in 
Somalia, though the nature of that threat has changed.  
 
President Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo, elected in 
February 2017, adopted a national strategy to counter 
violent extremism within a new national security 
architecture engaging civil society, the private sector, 
and overall the entire community sending a clear  signal 
to endure in the fight against terrorism. The Somali 
Police Forces supported by the Somali National Army 
will be left to continue the fight against terrorism, 
meanwhile a renew attempt to tolerance, dialogue, and 
peace has to prevail in Somalia as well as in the region. 
The National Security Policy, National Threat 
Assessment and National Policing model in Somalia 
highlight the need to move from a military-led offensive, 
against Al-Shabaab, to civilian law enforcement in order 
to stabilize the country, implementing the rule of law, 
enabling basic service-delivery and provide the 
opportunity to the local communities. This broad policy 
framework has been created for this shift to occur, and 
the support of the international community is needed to 
move forward. The United Nations and the European 
Union are contributing to this effort, by means of 
mentoring and giving advice for improved governance 
and institutional capacity to key line-ministries and 
related law-enforcement agencies tasked to implement 
the National Security Policy and the National Policing 
Model. These frameworks reflect the priorities of Somali 
authorities, requesting support to the international 
community to the development of law-enforcement 
capacity, with a special focus on capacity in regional 
administrations. Maritime security is one element of the 
frameworks; however, the biggest gaps and 
opportunities for significant contribution remain on 
land, addressing structural challenges, which are key to 
tackling law-enforcement and governance more 
holistically. Fighting violent extremism remained a 
priority for Somalia and for the governments in the 
region and to counter violent extremism military actions 
are not sufficient neither preventive. Terrorism exploits 
governance, poverty, and illiteracy and cannot be fought 
just with an army; there must be others. Somalis are 
100% Sunni-Muslims with the right and peaceful 
interpretation of Islam and a community that struggles 
to get involved and participate in the political, economic 
and social development of the country to promote 
peace and security.  
 
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) reports that 740.000 people die 
because of armed conflict each year and it also seriously 
undermines the attainment of the Millennium 
Development Goals. Armed conflict and violence 
undermine peace-building, state-building, development 
and an effective system of governance. Therefore, 
addressing the terrorism within the armed violence 
reduction under the principle listed above might 
effectively contribute to restoring peace and security. 
 
Somalia continues to be seen as a treat to international 
peace and security in the region and in the world. In 
agreement with Kizito Sabala, Aisha Ahmad & Edwin 
Rutto “domestic conflicts have a propensity to become 
internationalized. Neighboring states are drawn into 
conflict through refugee flows, humanitarian crises and 
the trafficking of arms.” Somalia remains a major threat 
to security in the Horn of Africa. Securing the peace of 
Somalia is the most critical task ahead of this 
government because Somalia’s domestic threats and 
internal security negatively affect region development, 
peace, and stability. Brutal attacks of violent extremism 
were conducted in Somalia and outside Somalia 
territory. Lidwien Kapteijn considers that in Somalia, as 
for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, armed violence 
broke down law and order, sweeping away many 
people’s adherence to normative ethical behavior and 
cultural script. Kapteijn argued that “the orchestration
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of violence against civilian operated from Al Shabaab is 
consciously used as a political instrument: in the 
absence of another public agenda than their own 
groups’ political dominance, they could envision no role 
for member defined as “other”; simple logic demanded 
their removal.” Al Shabaab as any other terrorist group 
in their attempt to change the political and social 
dimension used the same political instruments, violence, 
of those regime/leaders they attempt to remove. 
 
As attacks increasingly showed the need for the 
neighboring countries to strategically address the fight 
against terrorism and transnational organized crime 
through which terrorism is often funded especially after 
AS pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda increasing the fear of 
violent extremism and terrorism threats both in Somalia 
and to the wider region.  There is evidence of Da'esh 
courting AS allegiance in particular in the northern parts 
of Somalia. To add, as the military conflict against 
Da'esh progresses in Syria, and Iraq, there is a potential 
risk that foreign terrorist fighters may either return to 
their homelands or look towards other 'permissive' 
areas/countries and potentially impacting on the Horn 
of Africa region and its dynamics with AS. Gulf’s state 
political influence strongly grows influencing Somalia 
and the Horn of Africa political development and it is 
likely to continue to grow as wider regional dynamics 
involving other key partners such as Turkey, Ethiopia 
and recently Egypt play out in Somalia. Thus, Somalia's 
security and stability is vital for the larger Horn of Africa 
region and beyond. The protracted crisis in South Sudan 
degenerated, the continued crisis in Yemen might 
further affect Somalia’ s instability.  
 
Security and Development Nexus  
In the modern history of Somalia, Lewis considers that 
regeneration of social cohesion and nationalism, as 
opposed to the sectarian nature of Somalis, is one of the 
main challenges Somalia has ahead, considering that 
Somalis share the same language, culture, and religion. 
It will take time for President Framajo to rebuild the 
state’s credibility among Somalis because the state itself 
failed in protecting it’s individual’s interests and 
security. The rebuilding of security governance is not a 
process in isolation: the security process needs to go 
along with the development process due to the nexus 
between the two. Fundamental to this is that the long-
term solution for Somalia's security lies in the creation 
of capable and accountable national armed forces in the 
form of the Somali national and rapid economic 
development to offer employment opportunities 
preventing terrorism recruitment. With a young 
population and limited employment opportunities, 
economic development can create employment 
reducing the chance of radicalization and ensure that 
Somali security institutions are affordable for the 
country in the long term.  In Somalia, the regained 
territories from AS must see the benefits of 
development assistance to change perceptions and 
reduce the breeding ground for extremists.  
 
According to the World Bank in November 2018, 
Somalia’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth 
weakened in 2017 due to the severe drought. Although 
Somalia averted widespread famine in 2017, the 
drought led to large-scale food insecurity, affecting 
more than six million people. More than half of the 
population lives in poverty and a large proportion is 
sensitive to negative shocks. GDP growth declined to 
2.3% in 2017, compared to 4.4% in 2016. Economic 
activity is mainly anchored in agriculture and the 
services sector. The agriculture sector experienced near-
total collapse with crop failures, a widespread shortage 
of water and pasture, and increased livestock mortality. 
Inflationary pressure increased in 2017 due to drought-
driven by significant increases in crop prices. 
Implementation of fiscal policy has significantly 
improved, but challenges remain. Domestic revenue 
grew by 26.5%, from $112.7 million in 2016 to $142.6 
million in 2017 driven by trade taxes. Donor grants 
almost doubled to $103.6 million in 2017 from $55.3 
million in 2016 – a remarkable performance with 85% of 
the commitments being realized compared to only 50% 
realized in 2016. Despite the improved performance, the 
government is still struggling with basic challenges in its 
fiscal operations. Recurrent expenditures account for 
almost all expenditure, with capital spending accounting 
for just 3% of total spending in 2016 and 2017. Weak 
expenditure controls result in ad hoc cash rationing to 
ensure a balanced budget and zero accumulation of 
arrears hence, affecting overall budget execution. 
Current spending priorities focus on security and 
administrative services, which account for almost 90% 
of total spending hence the crowding-out provision for 
economic and social services. The security and 
development nexus needs to be glue by the social 
cohesion. To agree with Serageldin (1996) “social 
cohesion is founded on social capital, glue that holds 
society together. Norms, values, and social relations are 
the bonds that hold communities together. These are
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the means by which to reach across differences and 
begin to build trust” (p. 196). 
 
EU Strategic Interests  Somalia  Security  
Somalia sits on the strategically important corner of the 
Horn of Africa. The region sees a considerable amount 
of maritime activities – it is an important commercial 
shipping route and has large offshore marine resources 
– fish stocks and potential offshore oil and gas deposits. 
In the past ten years, Somalia emerged as the world’s 
foremost source of piracy. International naval presence 
has suppressed piracy even though it is not eradicated 
as it is assessed that intent and capacity remain. 
Enhancing Somali owned maritime security and law 
enforcement capacities, in line with the Somali National 
Security Policy, is necessary. However, there is a 
growing understanding that maritime crime, linked to 
transnational organised crime, must be understood in a 
wider context and needs to be addressed on land the 
sea. 
 
Somalia is also an important source (and transit) country 
of migration to Europe. Continued or increased 
instability in Somalia, directly and indirectly, affect the 
EU through (illegal) migration, spill-over of conflicts, 
organised crime, a proliferation of small arms and light 
weapons, as well as terrorism. In the context of 
migration, support to the security sector could 
contribute to the positive implementation of the 
Valletta Plan of Action of November 2015. 
 
The EU engagement in Somalia has been intensified over 
the years and the EU remains the largest donor in terms 
of both political engagement and financial and technical 
support. The EU has played a leading role in the five 
compact priorities - Inclusive Politics, Security, Justice, 
Economic Foundations and Revenues and Services. The 
most notable financial support is directed at supporting 
AMISOM, where the African Peace Facility (APF) has 
provided support to soldier's allowances and other 
issues since the launch of the mission amounting to over 
€1.1B since its launch in 2007. The African Peace 
Facilities was founded to respond to the African leader’s 
request of support and it is financed through the 
European Development Fund in support of the African 
Union’s and the African Regional Economic Communities 
peace and security process. Although with a broader 
pan-African remit, most of its funds have been 
principally dedicated to AMISOM however also Mali and 
the Lake Chad region benefitted of the APF funds to 
fight Boko Haram.  
 
The EU acknowledged the need to engage in the 
security sector in Somalia as an instrumental factor in 
the stabilization of Eastern Africa and for the overall 
fight against extremist terrorism that is challenging 
international peace and security. It is also a rallying 
point for some of the neighboring countries, joint efforts 
in Somalia can contribute to developing a more 
cooperative regional approach towards security 
including the greater efforts in the provision of basic 
services in rescued areas to highlight the benefits of 
legitimate authorities. There are a number of illegal or 
illicit traffics in the Indian Ocean (arms, humans, drugs, 
coal, etc.) that remain largely unchecked and that fuel 
instability in Somalia and beyond. It is known by now 
that the long-term battle against AS, and for the 
establishment of state authority more generally, will be 
achieved through the provision of the rule of law. This 
argues strongly for international community 
engagement with a focus on supporting the security 
apparatus at the central and regional levels, including 
integrated non-state security actors. The strategic 
objectives for the EU are unchanged in relation to 
Somalia, however, the new aspect is the increased 
engagement with non-traditional actors from the Gulf 
States and their involvement is changing the HoA 
regional dynamics, not least due to the Yemen situation. 
Secondly, the relatively unfettered migration seen into 
Europe of the last years since 2011 has increased the 
need to look at providing deep stability in source 
countries. Eritrea is a significant source country, 
whereas Somalia only accounted for 2% of the total 
flows to Europe in 2014. Whilst Somalia is not in itself a 
major source of migration, it is an important migrant 
route from Africa to the Arabian Peninsula and, 
sometimes, onwards to Europe. The migration risk may 
also arise in Somalia should Yemen further destabilize 
and cause an inflow of Somali diaspora back into 
Somalia. The third development has been an increase in 
radicalization within the HoA, not least due to the rise of 
the so-called Islamic State (or ISIS), with a risk of further 
spreading violent extremism into the HoA.  
 
Somali Security and Defence Forces  
There is a general consensus that regional, mostly 
"irregular" forces are more effective in the fight against 
Al Shabab than the Somali National Army. This stems 
partly from the fact that the National Army is perceived 
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reflecting through its composition the real structure and 
interests of the country. This raises suspicions at the 
regional level. The regions themselves have been 
developing a parallel, more "informal" forces, such as 
the "darwish". These regional forces are considered by 
some AMISOM commanders as the most effective in 
fighting Al Shabab, whereas the National Army is not 
really contributing to these efforts. The main challenge 
ahead is, therefore, the integration between regional 
and federal military efforts. This could comprise building 
the National Army based on regional forces, or in some 
way reconverting the regional forces into robust police 
that will assist in the stabilization of areas recovered 
from Al Shabab control or combinations of these 
options. This key issue needs to be tackled head-on by 
the Somali authorities and reflected on an agreed 
"security and defence architecture". In addition, security 
transformation implies civilian oversight of security 
forces and to offer an “alternative paradigm” as 
Olowama Ismail considers that 
 
while the principle of civilian rule over the military or 
more specific operational issues is often tackled in 
security reform processes, the larger question of defining 
new national security priorities is not always considered 
comprehensively and consultative. The priorities are 
often assumed or defined by an exclusive cohort of 
national security and political actors. A gendered lens on 
national security and reform however provides an 
alternative paradigm and frame of reference. By virtue 
of directing attention towards individuals and socio-
cultural contexts, it sheds light on security from the 
standpoint of the recipient, not the providers. 
 
Somalia has posed a key security challenge for the 
international community in recent decades. However, 
the 22,000-strong AMISOM force has helped to stabilize 
the country somehow making notable gains against AS. 
Notwithstanding the force's successes, AMISOM's 
funding was cut by 20 percent in 2018 due to the lack of 
funding and 20,000 AMISOM troops should be 
drawdown by 2020. Uganda has announced that it will 
pull its approximately 6,700 troops from Somalia in 2018 
and the same goes for Kenya, Burundi, Ethiopia, and 
Djibouti. However, in a meeting in Kampala last March 
2018 the Head of State from Uganda, Kenya, Burundi, 
Ethiopia, and Djibouti met to discuss the serious 
repercussion AMISOM drawdown could have and in a 
communiqué Uganda's foreign minister, “Sam Kutesa, 
said that the decision to drawdown the AMISOM troop 
taken in 2017 is not realistic and shall be re-discussed 
because the draw-down would lead to a reversal of the 
gains made by AMISOM."  It is, in fact, uncertain if the 
Somali National Army and the Somali National Police will 
be able to fully take up AMISOM functions and fight 
against Al Shaabab. AS has not been defeated yet, and 
security concerns remain pre-eminent to allow for 
development and sustainability in Southern Somalia. 
Hence, the security umbrella provided by AMISOM, 
directly supported by the AU, the EU, and UN, is 
required as the main security guarantor. AMISOM has 
shifted towards a greater focus on counter-insurgency 
and in preparing and assisting Somali security forces in 
the fight against terrorism. External funding and support 
for AMISOM remain critical as long as it is necessary. 
The EU's role as the major financial contributor is, 
however, increasingly problematic and AMISOM, 
therefore, is working with others, including the AU, the 
troop contributors, the UN, and third countries, to 
ensure adequate burden-sharing and an eventual exit 
plan. 
 
The Somali government has to consolidate its power 
because security gaps remain throughout the country 
and terrorist attacks still plague its capital and all the 
other regions, any lapse in security could result in a 
reversal of Somalia's gains in the last 8 years. The 
country is fighting an open war, alongside AMISOM, 
against Islamist that still holds territory. There is a very 
delicate political balance as regional administrations 
emerge, federalism has reduced the likelihood of 
Government political decision-making, corruption 
increased, and the existing institutions are either a very 
week or they exist in name only. There is growing 
fatigue within AMISOM and the broader international 
community to continue a military offensive against Al-
Shabaab when the long-term solution lies in local 
governance structures and law-enforcement capacity 
within the regional administration; AMISOM fatigue, 
necessitating a rapid shift to civilian law-enforcement 
and transition efforts from AMISOM to the SNA.  
 
Conclus ion  
Somalia has been often the victim of its geography, from 
the time of the colonial power to the Cold War. The 
most contemporary regional and international powers 
made no attempts to prevent and moved from the Cold 
War era to intra-federal state conflicts through a 
peaceful process transition: from an authoritaria
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 regime to multi-party democracy and the entrenchment 
of economic liberalism.  Somalia collapses and has been 
unable to successfully manage its rebuilding. To achieve 
peace among all Somalis, regardless of creed, ethnic 
origin, and social status there must be a nation-building 
process within the Etat de Droit and the implementation 
of a constitutional democracy in which the Federal 
States are fully supported and sustained by the central 
government in a joint effort to implement a new social 
contract. It's the application of the principle of 
constructivism.  In this regard, Nye considers that 
“constructivism draws on differences by which leaders, 
people, and culture alter their preferences, shape their  
identities and learn new behaviors…Constructivism 
suggests that concept such as nations and sovereignty 
that give meaning to our lives as well as our theories are 
socially constructed not just out there but as a 
permanent reality.” There must be full respect for 
human rights and governance accountability to the 
citizens while ensuring socio-political stability. It is 
unquestionable that President Farmaajo is committed to 
world peace and the preservation of world order 
engendered and sustained by a renewed domestic 
politics and through harmonious relations with 
neighbouring countries and the international 
community. Somali’s peace process is preceding building 
blocks and addressing the root causes of the social 
conflict being political, economic or social including the 
challenges of any incoming factor either through a 
political resolution including the existence of non-state 
actors. Non-state actors formed in the absence of state 
security actors have been left behind to radicalize 
because of their exclusion from the political process and 
the socio-economic development. Kizito Sabala, Aisha 
Ahmad & Edwin Rutto agree that  
 
Post Conflict, peace building is a multidimensional 
process of complex and social, economic, military and 
political recovery in countries emerging out of conflict or 
civil war. Peacebuilding involves engaging various 
stakeholders; including sub-and para-state militias in 
order to resolve ongoing disputes between the warring 
factions. Moreover, peacebuilding includes a variety of 
social recovery aspects, which target both civilians and 
militiamen in seek reconciliation between the victims 
and the aggressors.    
 
Somali’s governance shall represent and legitimize the 
Constitution and widely respond to the voter’s demand.  
 
As federalism continues to develop in Somalia, the role 
and significance of regional administrations continue to 
grow, especially in relation to security and defense. 
Their capacity to deliver services to citizens within the 
Rule of Law is essential to stabilize the country and 
address criminality, including piracy and other forms of 
transnational and organised maritime crime. This 
capacity needs to begin from the governance structures 
of the regional administrations and be translated into an 
institutional capacity for local law-enforcement 
agencies. Security for the population is provided and 
sustained in local communities through the efforts of 
local law enforcement. The Federal Government in 
Mogadishu has to create the conditions and frameworks 
for this to happen. The increasing importance of 
regional administrations (Federal Member States) is 
crucial. Somali’s government shall continue its 
commitment to establish unified, capable, accountable, 
and right based Somali Federal institutions, which could 
provide basic safety and security for its citizens and 
accountable and sustainable financial institutions. It 
shall create a more secure, safe and accountable 
Somalia able to maintain peace within its borders and 
with its neighbors and restoring and maintaining 
internal security. The Somali’s government shall protect 
its civilians, with special attention to securing the rights 
of women, youth, and children increasing equitable 
access to justice and contributing to the implementation 
of the rule of law, applying human rights standards and 
adhering to international humanitarian law. In this 
process, social cohesion is the key intervening variable 
between social capital and social conflict. Strong social 
cohesion reduces the risk of social disorganization, 
fragmentation, and exclusion that may lead to 
aggression and violence (Genge 2001:23). Most 
disturbing, however, is the very real possibility that 
Somalia’s fragile security progress could be undone by 
mismanagement of the political situation.  
 
Violent extremism and terrorism pose a threat, both 
within Somalia and to the wider region, as witnessed by 
attacks in Kenya and Uganda. Gulf influence on Somali 
and Horn politics has grown and is likely to continue to 
grow as wider regional dynamics involving other key 
partners such as Turkey, Ethiopia and recently Egypt 
play out in Somalia.  IGAD and the member states in the 
Horn of Africa, legitimized by the AU Convention on the 
Prevention of Terrorism should address terrorism 
regionally and in a comprehensive manner.
Simonetta Silvestri 
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